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Abstract
Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017),
have been attracting considerable attention in the litera-
ture of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known
mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit, non-
wastefulness, and individual rationality for the multi-unit
unit-demand auction, except for some naı¨ve ones. In this pa-
per, we first propose a mechanism that satisfies all the above
properties. We then make a comprehensive comparison with
two naı¨ve mechanisms, showing that the proposed mecha-
nism dominates them in social surplus, seller’s revenue, and
incentive of buyers for truth-telling. We also analyze the char-
acteristics of the social surplus and the revenue achieved by
the proposed mechanism, including the constant approxima-
bility of the worst-case efficiency loss and the complexity of
optimizing revenue from the seller’s perspective.
1 Introduction
Auction theory has attracted much attention in artificial in-
telligence as a foundation of multi-agent resource alloca-
tion. One of the mainstreams in the literature is analyzing
auctions from the perspective of mechanism design. In par-
ticular, several works studied how to design strategy-proof
auctions, which incentivize each buyer to truthfully report
her valuation function, regardless of the reports of the other
buyers. One critical contribution in the literature is the devel-
opment of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG),
which satisfies strategy-proofness and various other proper-
ties (Vickrey 1961; Clarke 1971; Groves 1973).
Li et al. (2017) proposed a new model of auctions, in
which buyers are distributed in a social network and the in-
formation on the auction propagates over it. Utilizing a so-
cial network, the seller can advertise the auction to more po-
tential buyers beyond her followers, as many works studied
in network science (Emek et al. 2011; Borgatti et al. 2009;
Jackson 2008; Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos 2003). From
the buyers’ perspective, however, forwarding the informa-
tion increases the number of buyers, which reduces the pos-
sibility that they will get the item. Therefore, the main chal-
lenge in the auction via social network is how to incentivize
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buyers to forward the information to as many followers as
possible, as well as truthfully reporting their valuation func-
tions. For selling a single unit of an item, Li et al. (2017)
developed an auction mechanism in which each buyer is in-
centivized to forward the information to her followers.
Zhao et al. (2018) studied a multi-unit unit-demand auc-
tion via social network, where each unit is identical and each
buyer requires a unit. They proposed the generalized infor-
mation diffusion mechanism (GIDM) and argued that it is
strategy-proof. However, Takanashi et al. (2019) pointed out
an error in their proof and argued that GIDM is not strategy-
proof. They also proposed a strategy-proof mechanism for
the same model, which however violates a revenue condi-
tion called non-deficit, i.e., the seller might suffer a deficit.
To the best of our knowledge, for the multi-unit unit-demand
auction via social network, no mechanism satisfying both
strategy-proofness and non-deficit has been developed, ex-
cept for some naı¨ve ones.
The main objective of this paper is to propose a mecha-
nism that satisfies both strategy-proofness and non-deficit,
as well as some other properties. As Takanashi et al. (2019)
pointed out, no mechanism satisfies those properties and
Pareto efficiency, i.e., maximizing the social surplus, un-
der certain natural assumptions. They thus considered weak-
ening the non-deficit condition. In this paper, on the other
hand, we consider a weaker efficiency property called non-
wastefulness, which only requires the allocation of as many
units as possible. Non-wastefulness has its own importance
in practice. For example, in a spectrum auction, it is impor-
tant to allocate as much frequency range as possible to car-
riers in order to guarantee a sufficient number of services.
We propose a new mechanism, called distance-based
mechanism, for a multi-unit unit-demand auction via so-
cial network, which satisfies strategy-proofness, non-deficit,
non-wastefulness, and individual rationality, i.e., no buyer
receives negative utility under truth-telling, and whose de-
scription is much simpler than GIDM. It is inspired by the
concept of the diffusion critical tree, originally proposed in
Li et al. (2017), which specifies, for each buyer i, the set of
critical buyers for i’s participation. If a buyer j is critical for
another buyer i’s participation, i.e., if i cannot participate in
the auction without j’s forwarding of information, j must
receive a higher priority in the competition.
We then make a comprehensive comparison with two
naı¨ve mechanisms that also satisfy (most of) the above prop-
erties. One is based on VCG, being applied only to the
buyers who are directly connected to the seller. The other
mechanism simply allocates the units in the first-come-first-
served manner with no payment. We show that the distance-
based mechanism dominates both of these naı¨ve ones in
terms of social surplus and the seller’s revenue. Furthermore,
in those mechanisms, hiding the information, combinedwith
reporting the true value, is also a dominant strategy, while
this is not the case in our mechanism when k ≥ 2. This indi-
cates that each buyer has a stronger incentive for truth-telling
in the distance-based mechanism.
We further analyze the characteristics of the social surplus
and the revenue of the distance-based mechanism. About so-
cial surplus, it guarantees that each winner is in the set of
top-k buyers except for her followers. It also has a constant
worst-case efficiency loss, based on a measure proposed by
Nath and Sandholm (2018), when an optimal reserve price
is introduced. About revenue, we show that a revenue mono-
tonicity condition fails and that maximizing revenue by op-
timally sending the information is NP-complete.
2 Preliminaries
We first define the standard notations for multi-unit unit-
demand auctions. Let s be a seller who is willing to sell the
set K of k identical units. Let N be the set of n buyers,
where each buyer i ∈ N has a unit-demand valuation func-
tion for K . Let x = (xi)i∈N ⊂ {0, 1}
n be an allocation,
which specifies who obtains a unit, where xi = 1 indicates
that buyer i obtains a unit under allocation x, and xi = 0
otherwise. Let vi ∈ R≥0 indicate the true unit-demand value
of buyer i for a single unit. We assume that each buyer’s util-
ity is quasi-linear, i.e., the utility of buyer i under allocation
x, when she pays pi ∈ R, is given as vi · xi − pi.
Next, we define additional notations for the auction via
social network. For each buyer i ∈ N , let ri ⊆ N \ {i}
be the set of buyers to whom buyer i can forward the infor-
mation, called i’s followers. Also, let rs ⊆ N be the set of
direct buyers, i.e., those to whom the seller s can directly
send the information. Given (ri)i∈N∪{s}, we define the auc-
tion network as a digraphG = (N ∪{s}, E), where for each
i ∈ N ∪ {s} and each j ∈ ri, a directed edge, from i to j,
is added to the set E. Note that ri is also private informa-
tion of buyer i in our model, so the auction network is de-
fined according to reported r′ = (r′i)i∈N , where r
′
i indicates
the set of i’s followers to whom i forwards the information.
To summarize, for each i, the private information is given
as θi = (vi, ri), called the true type of i, consisting of the
true value vi and the set ri of the followers. Any reportable
type θ′i = (v
′
i, r
′
i) of i with true type θi = (vi, ri) satisfies
r′i ⊆ ri, i.e., a buyer can only forward the information to her
followers. Let R(θi) be the set of all reportable types by i
with θi. Also, let θ
′ denote the profile of types reported by
all buyers andΘ denote the set of all possible type profiles.
For notation simplicity, we introduce additional technical
terms regarding the auction network. A buyer i is connected
if a path s → · · · → i in G is formed based on the reported
r
′. Let Nˆ denote the set of connected buyers. For each i,
let d(i) denote the distance of the shortest path from s to
i. If i is not connected, we assume d(i) = ∞. Given θ′,
a buyer j ∈ Nˆ is a critical parent of i ∈ Nˆ if, without
j’s participation, i is not connected, i.e., j appears in any
path from s to i in G. Let Pi(θ
′) ⊆ Nˆ denote the set of all
critical parents of i under θ′. The buyer j ∈ Pi(θ
′) closest
to i is called the least critical parent of i. An allocation x is
feasible if
∑
i∈N xi ≤ k, and xi = 1 implies i ∈ Nˆ for each
i ∈ N . LetX be the set of all feasible allocations.
Now we are ready to give a formal description of (di-
rect revelation) mechanisms1. A mechanism (f, t) consists
of two components, an allocation rule f and a profile of
transfer rules (ti)i∈N . An allocation rule f maps a profile
θ
′ of reported types to a feasible allocation f(θ′) ∈ X . We
sometimes use the notation of f(θ′i, θ
′
−i) instead, especially
when we focus on the report of a specific buyer i, where θ′−i
indicates the profile of types reported by the others. Given
θ
′, fi(θ
′) ∈ {0, 1} denotes the assignment to buyer i. Each
transfer rule ti maps a profile θ
′ to a real number ti(θ
′) ∈ R,
which indicates the amount that buyer i pays to the seller.
Here, we define several properties that mechanisms
should satisfy. Feasibility requires that for any input, the al-
location returned by the mechanism is feasible.
Definition 1. A mechanism (f, t) is feasible if for any θ′,
f(θ′) is feasible.
Strategy-proofness is an incentive property, requiring that,
for any buyer, reporting its true valuation and forwarding the
information to all of its followers is a dominant strategy.
Definition 2. Given a mechanism (f, t) and a buyer i with
true type θi = (vi, ri), a report θ
∗
i = (v
∗
i , r
∗
i ) ∈ R(θi) is a
dominant strategy if for any θ
′
−i and θ
′
i ∈ R(θi),
vi · f(θ∗i , θ
′
−i)− ti(θ
∗
i , θ
′
−i) ≥ vi · f(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i)− ti(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i)
holds. A mechanism (f, t) is strategy-proof if reporting θi is
a dominant strategy for any i under (f, t).
Individual rationality is a property related to the incen-
tives of the buyers for participation, which requires that
truth-telling guarantees a non-negative utility.
Definition 3. A mechanism (f, t) is individually rational if
for any i, θi, and θ
′
−i, vi ·f(θi, θ
′
−i)−ti(θi, θ
′
−i) ≥ 0 holds.
Non-deficit is a property about seller’s revenue, which re-
quires that the seller’s revenue cannot be negative. Note that
it does not consider each individual transfer and thus does
not imply the non-negativity of each buyer’s payment.
Definition 4. A mechanism (f, t) satisfies non-deficit if for
any θ′,
∑
i∈N ti(θ
′) ≥ 0 holds.
Non-wastefulness is a property about the efficiency of
allocation, which requires that the mechanism allocate as
many units as possible. Note that the traditional definition
of non-wastefulness ignores the network structure, and thus
the second term in RHS is replaced with |N |.
1As discussed in the appendix, the revelation principle holds
under our assumption R on reportable subset r′i ⊆ ri. Therefore,
focusing on direct revelation mechanisms is w.l.o.g.
Definition 5. A mechanism (f, t) is non-wasteful if for any
θ
′,
∑
i∈N fi(θ
′) ≥ min{k, |Nˆ |} holds.
2.1 Two Naı¨ve Mechanisms for Comparison
One might expect that those properties hold in naı¨ve mech-
anisms. Indeed, we can easily find the following two candi-
dates. The formal definitions are in the appendix. We com-
pare their performances with that of our new mechanism in
the following sections.
The first mechanism applies VCG to only the direct buy-
ers rs. It satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality,
non-deficit, and non-wastefulness for |rs| ≥ k. We refer to
this mechanism as No-Diffusion-VCG (ND-VCG in short).
Such a mechanism is also considered in Li et al. (2017), al-
though they focused on single-item auctions.
The second mechanism gives the units to buyers for
free, in the first-come-first-served manner, which is re-
ferred to as FCFS-F. It satisfies individual rationality,
non-deficit, and non-wastefulness, and it is strategy-proof
when earlier arrivals are not allowed, e.g., based on
ascending order of d(·), as usually assumed in online mech-
anism design (Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg, and Parkes 2004;
Todo et al. 2012).
3 Distance-Based Mechanism
The definition of the new mechanism is given in Defini-
tion 6. A key concept in describing the mechanism is the
diffusion critical tree T (θ′), originally introduced in Zhao
et al. (2018). Given θ′, the diffusion critical tree T (θ′) is
a rooted tree, where s is the root, the nodes of T (θ′) are
all the connected buyers Nˆ , and for each node i ∈ Nˆ and
its least critical parent j ∈ P (θ′), an edge (j, i) is drawn.
If Pi(θ
′) = ∅, we draw an edge (s, i). Furthermore, given
T (θ′) and a node i, all of the nodes in the subtree of T (θ′)
rooted at i are called i’s descendants. Also, given a report
θ
′, a subset S ⊆ Nˆ , and an integer k′ ≤ k, v∗(S, k′) de-
notes the k′-th highest value in S under θ′. For k′ ≤ 0, let
v∗(S, k′) =∞. In addition, if |S| < k′, then v∗(S, k′) = 0.
Definition 6. Given θ′, first order the connected buyers Nˆ
in ascending order of d(·), with arbitrary fixed tie-breaking.
Note that d(·) is the distance from s in the original graph,
not the distance in T (θ′). The order ≻ is called the priority
order. For each i 6∈ Nˆ , fi(θ
′) = ti(θ
′) = 0. For each i ∈ Nˆ ,
let Nˆ−i be the set of all connected buyers except i and its
descendants in T (θ′). It then runs as follows:
1: k′ ← k,W ← ∅
2: for each i ∈ Nˆ selected in the order of ≻ do
3: pi ← v∗(Nˆ−i \W,k′)
4: if v′i ≥ pi then
5: fi(θ
′)← 1, ti(θ
′)← pi
6: k′ ← k′ − 1,W ← W ∪ {i}
7: else
8: fi(θ
′)← 0, ti(θ
′)← 0
9: end if
10: end for
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Figure 1: Example of Buyers Network and Corresponding
Diffusion Critical Tree.
The following example demonstrates how the distance-
based mechanism works. The network of buyers, defined by
r, as well as their true values, is shown in Fig. 1.
Example 1. Consider three units and seven buyers N =
{i1, i2, . . . , i7}. Each vertex in the left figure of Fig. 1 cor-
responds to a buyer, and the number in each vertex denotes
her true valuation. The priority order is given as i1 ≻ i2 ≻
· · · ≻ i7. Assume that every buyer forwards the informa-
tion to all of her followers, i.e., Nˆ = N . The corresponding
diffusion critical tree is given on the right in Fig. 1.
The assignment to buyers is computed one-by-one, in the
priority order. For buyer i1, the price is given as pi1 =
v∗(Nˆ−i1 \ W,k − |W |) = v
∗({i2, i3, i4, i5, i6, i7}, 3) =
vi5 = 50. Since pi1 > vi1 , she does not win a unit. For buyer
i2, the price is given as pi2 = v
∗({i1, i3, i5, i6, i7}, 3) =
vi7 = 40. Note that vi4 is ignored because i2 is a criti-
cal parent of i4. Since vi2 > pi2 , she wins a unit; W is
updated to {i2}, and k is decremented to 2. For i3, the
price is given as pi3 = v
∗({i1, i4}, 2) = vi1 = 30. Since
vi3 > pi3 , she wins a unit; W is updated to {i2, i3},
and k is decremented to 1. For i4, the price is given as
pi4 = v
∗({i1, i5, i6, i7}, 1) = vi6 = 66. Since pi4 > vi4 ,
she does not win a unit.
For i5, the price is given as pi5 = v
∗({i1, i4}, 1) =
vi4 = 45. Since vi5 > pi5 , she wins a unit;W is updated to
{i2, i3, i5} and k is decremented to 0. Since no unit remains,
the prices for the remaining buyers, i6 and i7, become infin-
ity, and thus neither of the buyers wins a unit. To sum up, i2,
i3, and i5 are winners, who pay 40, 30, and 45 respectively.
Let us clarify how it differs from GIDM by Zhao et al.
(2018) and how it maintains strategy-proofness. GIDM first
assigns, according to the reported θ′, a certain number of
units to each subtree of T (θ′). The buyers in a subtree then
compete with each other to buy the units assigned to it. This
is something like creating a sub-market for each subtree.
However, by not forwarding the information, some buyer,
who originally loses due to the existence of some winning
parent, can reduce the number of units assigned to the sub-
tree, make the sub-market more competitive and the parent
losing, and obtain a chance to win. This is actually the case
found by Takanashi et al. (2019).
The distance-based mechanism also uses the diffusion
critical tree. However, it does not create such a sub-market
for each subtree. Instead, it has a single market with all of the
units, where buyers’ priorities are defined based on the dis-
tance d(·), which is not successfully manipulable; no buyer
can make the distance shorter by not forwarding the infor-
mation to her followers, which is shown by Lemma 1.
3.1 Properties of Distance-Based Mechanism
We show feasibility, individual rationality, and non-deficit
in Theorem 1, non-wastefulness in Theorem 2, and strategy-
proofness in Theorem 3. The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 are
in the appendix. Let Wˆ denote a set of winners {w1, w2, . . .}
and Wˆ≻j denote {w ∈ Wˆ | w ≻ j}.
Theorem 1. The distance-based mechanism satisfies feasi-
bility, individual rationality, and non-deficit.
Theorem 2. The distance-based mechanism is non-
wasteful.
Theorem 3. The distance-based mechanism is strategy-
proof.
Proof. Let (f, t) be the distance-based mechanism. It suf-
fices to show that (I) a buyer has no incentive not to forward
information to her followers, and that (II) a buyer cannot
obtain any gain by misreporting her value. That is, for any
θi = (vi, ri) and θ
′
i = (v
′
i, r
′
i) ∈ R(θi), consider an in-
termediate type θmi = (vi, r
′
i). The strategy-proofness con-
dition thus holds from (I) vi · fi(θi, θ
′
−i) − ti(θi, θ
′
−i) ≥
vi · fi(θ
m
i , θ
′
−i) − ti(θ
m
i , θ
′
−i) and (II) vi · fi(θ
m
i , θ
′
−i) −
ti(θ
m
i , θ
′
−i) ≥ vi · fi(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i)− ti(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i). These inequal-
ities are proven in Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 1. For any i, θi = (vi, ri), θ
′
−i, and θ
′
i = (vi, r
′
i)
s.t. r′i ⊂ ri, vi ·fi(θi, θ
′
−i)− ti(θi, θ
′
−i) ≥ vi ·fi(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i)−
ti(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i) holds.
Proof. By not forwarding the information, i can affect an-
other buyer j in one of the following ways: (i) buyer j, who
is originally a descendant of i in T (θ′), becomes discon-
nected, (ii) for buyer j, which originally satisfies i ≻ j, the
distance d(j) becomes larger. In case (i), j is originally not
included in Nˆ−i. Furthermore,making j disconnected might
decrease the price of other buyers j′ s.t. j′ ≻ i. Then there
is a chance that i’s price increases. Thus, not forwarding the
information is useless in case (i). In case (ii), even when d(j)
becomes larger, i ≻ j holds originally, and i’s price does not
change. Thus, not forwarding the information is futile.
Lemma 2. For any i, θi = (vi, ri), θ
′
−i, and θ
′
i = (v
′
i, ri),
vi · fi(θi, θ
′
−i)− ti(θi, θ
′
−i) ≥ vi · fi(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i)− ti(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i)
holds.
Proof. For buyer i, her price pi is given as: v
∗(Nˆ−i \
Wˆ≻i, k − |Wˆ≻i|). It is clear that pi ≥ v
∗(Nˆ−i, k) holds.
Let πi denote v
∗(Nˆ−i, k). πi is determined independently
from i’s declared evaluation value. If vi ≤ πi holds, i
cannot gain a positive utility regardless of her declaration.
Thus, assume vi > πi holds. Her actual price, i.e., pi =
v∗(Nˆ−i \ Wˆ≻i, k − |Wˆ≻i|), can be strictly larger than πi, if
some buyer j (where j ≻ i) s.t. v′j ≤ πi becomes a winner.
Note that if v′j > πi holds, j is within the top k − 1 winners
in Nˆ−i; the fact that j becomes a winner does not change pi.
The only way for i to decrease her price is to turn such a
winner into a loser by over-bidding.Assume j (where j ≻ i)
is such a winner. If j is i’s ancestor, i cannot affect j’s price.
Thus, j and i are in different branches in T (θ′). Since j is
a winner, v′j ≥ v
∗(Nˆ−j \ Wˆ≻j , k − |Wˆ≻j |) holds. Also,
to increase j’s price, vi must be smaller than or equal to
v∗(Nˆ−j \Wˆ≻j , k−|Wˆ≻j|). Note that i is included in Nˆ−j \
Wˆ≻j . If i is within the top k − |Wˆ≻j | − 1 buyers in Nˆ−j \
Wˆ≻j , even if i over-bids, she cannot change j’s price. Thus,
v′j ≥ vi holds. However, we assume v
′
j ≤ πi < vi holds.
This is a contradiction. Thus, i cannot decrease her price by
misreporting her evaluation value.
4 Efficiency Analysis
In this section we conduct a more detailed analysis on effi-
ciency. We show that any winner has a value that is in the
set of top-k buyers except for her descendants. Also, the so-
cial surplus of the distance-based mechanism is always as
large as those of the two naı¨ve ones. Furthermore, the worst-
case inefficiency of the distance-based mechanism can be
bounded by choosing an appropriate reserve price.
4.1 Bounded Efficiency
Pareto efficiency in the multi-unit auction with k units re-
quires that each buyer is a winner only if she is in the set
of top-k buyers, i.e., whose value is more than or equal to
the k-th highest value. However, it is not compatible with
strategy-proofness in our model with the buyers’ network,
since a buyer would have an incentive for not forwarding in-
formation to her descendants if she needs to compete with
them. Thus, we introduce a weaker concept called bounded
efficiency, which is consistent with the incentive of buyers
to forward the information. We say an allocation satisfies
bounded efficiency if each winner is in the set of top-k buy-
ers except for its descendants. Also, a mechanism satisfies
bounded efficiency if it always obtains a bounded efficient
allocation. By ignoring the descendants of each buyer, the
incentive of information forwarding can still be guaranteed.2
Indeed, our mechanism satisfies bounded efficiency.
Proposition 1. The distance-based mechanism satisfies
bounded efficiency: ∀θ′, ∀i ∈ Nˆ s.t. fi(θ
′) = 1, #{j ∈
Nˆ−i | v
′
j > v
′
i} < k.
Proof. Let i ∈ Nˆ be an arbitrarily chosen winner and
W ⊆ Nˆ \ {i} be the set of winners chosen before i in
the mechanism. By definition, the winner i faces the price
v∗(Nˆ−i \W,k − |W |). Since i is a winner, v
′
i ≥ v
∗(Nˆ−i \
W,k−|W |) holds, implying that there are less than k−|W |
buyers in Nˆ−i \W , whose values are strictly larger than v
′
i,
i.e., #{j ∈ Nˆ−i \W | v′j > v
′
i} < k − |W |. Therefore,
regardless of how many winners inW have a strictly larger
value than v′i, it holds that#{j ∈ Nˆ−i | v
′
j > v
′
i} < k.
2Note that the number of buyers, each of which is in the set of
top-k buyers except its descendants, can be more than k. Thus, it is
impossible to guarantee that all of them are winners.
This property is useful to show other characteristics of our
mechanism, e.g., Proposition 2. One can also easily observe
that the two naı¨ve mechanisms violate this property.
4.2 Social Surplus Domination
A mechanism (f, p) is said to dominate another mechanism
(f ′, p′) in terms of social surplus if for anyN and any θ′, it
holds that
∑
i∈N vi · fi(θ
′) ≥
∑
i∈N vi · f
′
i(θ
′).
Proposition 2. The distance-based mechanism dominates
both ND-VCG and FCFS-F in terms of social surplus, but
not vice versa.
Proof. When |Nˆ | ≤ k, every buyer receives a unit both in
the distance-based mechanism and in ND-VCG. We then
consider the cases of |Nˆ | > k. First observe that, when
rs = Nˆ , i.e., there only exist the direct buyers, the set of
winners in both mechanisms coincides, so that the top-k
buyers win a unit; this is obvious from the definition for
ND-VCG, and it also holds for the distance-based mecha-
nism from Proposition 1.
Furthermore, when we add new buyers into the network
one by one, in the ascending order of their distances from the
source, an original winner becomes a loser in the distance-
based mechanism only when her value is lower than the
value of the new buyer who have just been added. There-
fore, the arrival of a new buyer then weakly increases the
social surplus, while it does not change that of ND-VCG.
Also, there exists a case where the social surplus strictly
increases. Thus, the distance-based mechanism dominates
ND-VCG but not vice versa.
In the distance-based mechanism, each of the first k buy-
ers, who is a winner in FCFS-F, loses only when there ex-
ists some buyer who arrives later and has a larger value. The
distance-based mechanism therefore dominates FCFS-F, but
not vice versa.
4.3 Worst-Case Efficiency Loss
When the seller wants to maximize revenue, it is natural
to consider introducing a reserve price, i.e., the threshold
bidding value for each buyer to own the right to win a
unit (Myerson 1981). Letting vh be the reserve price that
the seller introduces, the distance-based mechanism with a
reserve price vh is then implemented by adding k dummy
vertices with value vh in T (θ
′), each of which is connected
only to s (see Fig. 2), while in line 2 of the algorithm the
dummies are not considered. In other words, those dummies
only affect Nˆ−i for each i ∈ Nˆ and have no chance to win.
The following example, which uses the same profile of the
reports with Example 1, demonstrates how the introduction
of a reserve price changes the allocation.
Example 2. See Fig. 2. Since there are three units, the mech-
anism first adds three dummy vertices. The price for i1 is
given as pi1 = 50, and she is not allocated a unit. The price
for i2 is given as pi2 = 45, and she wins a unit. The price
for i3 is given as pi3 = 40, which comes from the valua-
tion of the dummy buyer. Since her value is strictly less than
pi3 , she is not allocated a unit. The price for i4 is given as
pi4 = 50, and she is not allocated a unit. The price for i5 is
s 34
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40 45
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Figure 2: Implementation of Reserve Price vh(= 40) by
Adding k(= 3) Dummy Buyers to Diffusion Critical Tree.
given as pi5 = 40, and she wins a unit. At this moment one
unit remains. For buyer i6, the price is given as pi6 = 45,
which is strictly less than her value of 66. Thus, she wins a
unit. Now that no unit remains, the price for buyer i7 is set
to be infinity, To sum up, i2, i5, and i6 win a unit, and each
pays 40, 40, and 45, respectively.
Nearly identical proofs work for feasibility, non-deficit,
individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. However, the
introduction of a reserve price obviously breaks down non-
wastefulness. Actually, for any non-zero vh, there is a case
where no buyer wins a unit, e.g., vi < vh for every i ∈ N .
This implies that, when we consider the approximation ratio
an efficiency measure, the distance-based mechanism with
reserve price performs poorly. Even worse, the original def-
inition without a reserve price still has an arbitrarily worse
(i.e., arbitrarily close to zero) approximation ratio.
Nevertheless, it remains important to clarify the effect of
different reserve prices, given the practical usefulness of re-
serve prices. We therefore consider the following worst case
efficiency measure called α-inefficiency, inspired by Nath
and Sandholm (2018), and find that the optimal reserve price
is v¯/2, where v¯ is the upper bound of the value, i.e., for each
i ∈ N , vi ≤ v¯.
Definition 7. Let v¯ be the upper bound of the value. A mech-
anism (f, t) is α-inefficient if
α =
1
kv¯
sup
θ′∈Θ
[
max
x∈X
∑
i∈N
v′i · xi −
∑
i∈N
v′i · fi(θ
′)
]
.
The range of α is [0, 1], and having a smaller α is better.
We first provide a lemma that is useful to provide the worst-
case inefficiency, while its proof appears in the appendix.
Given θ′, let ℓ denote the number of connected buyers whose
values are no less than vh, i.e., ℓ := #{i ∈ Nˆ | vi ≥ vh}.
Lemma 3. Assuming all buyers declare their true values,
min(ℓ, k) units are allocated in the distance-based mecha-
nism with a reserve price.
Given the above lemma, we show that the distance-based
mechanism with vh = v¯/2 satisfies 1/2-inefficiency.
Theorem 4. The distance-based mechanism with reserve
price vh satisfies 1/2-inefficiency by setting vh = v¯/2.
Proof. If ℓ < k, the distance-based mechanism allocates
units to the top ℓ buyers within Nˆ (in terms of values) from
Lemma 3. The remaining k − ℓ units cannot be allocated
since the values of other buyers are less than vh. Thus, the
maximum efficiency loss is bounded by (k − ℓ)vh (if k − ℓ
buyers exist whose values are vh − ǫ, the efficiency loss be-
comes (k − ℓ)(vh − ǫ)). In particular, if the value of each
buyer is less than vh, ℓ becomes 0. Thus, the worst case effi-
ciency loss is k · vh. If ℓ ≥ k, the distance-based mechanism
allocates k units from Lemma 3. The maximum efficiency
loss is bounded by k(v¯− vh), which can occur, for instance,
when there are 2k buyers, forming a path graph, and those
k buyers closer to s have the value of vh, while the rest
have the value of v¯: the distance-based mechanism allocates
k units to the closest k buyers. From the above, the maxi-
mum efficiency loss is given asmax(k ·vh, k(v¯− vh)). This
is bounded from the bottom by k · v¯/2, which is achieved
by setting vh to v¯/2. Thus, the distance-based mechanism is
1/2-inefficient for vh = v¯/2.
Observe that there is a tradeoff between achieving non-
wastefulness and guaranteeing a better worst-case perfor-
mance by the mechanism with a reserve price, where the
former is achieved by vh = 0 and the latter by vh = v¯/2.
Obtaining the lower bound of α that a strategy-proof mech-
anism achieves remains an open question. However, since 0-
inefficiency implies Pareto efficiency, the impossibility sug-
gested by Takanashi et al. (2019) implies that no strategy-
proof mechanism that also satisfies non-deficit and individ-
ual rationality achieves 0-inefficiency.
5 Revenue Analysis
The seller’s revenue is also an important evaluation criterion
for auction mechanisms. In this section, we first show that
the seller’s revenue in the distance-based mechanism is no
less than those of the two naı¨ve ones. We also show that
maximizing the revenue by optimally choosing the set of its
followers to whom it sends the information is NP-complete.
5.1 Revenue Domination
We define the domination in terms of the seller’s revenue
analogously. A mechanism (f, p) dominates another mech-
anism (f ′, p′) in terms of the seller’s revenue if for any N
and any θ′, it holds that
∑
i∈N ti(θ
′) ≥
∑
i∈N t
′
i(θ
′).
Proposition 3. The distance-based mechanism dominates
both ND-VCG and FCFS-F in terms of the seller’s revenue,
but not vice versa.
Proof. The distance-based mechanism obviously dominates
ND-VCG when |rs| ≤ k, since the price for each winner
in ND-VCG is zero. When |rs| > k, each winner in ND-
VCG pays v∗(rs \ {i}, k). On the other hand, the price pi
for each winner i in the distance-based mechanism satisfies
pi ≥ v∗(Nˆ−i, k) by definition. For every winner i, Nˆ−i is
a superset of rs \ {i}. Therefore, from the monotonicity of
v∗ on the first argument, pi ≥ v∗(Nˆ−i, k) ≥ v∗(rs \ {i}, k)
holds. Also, there exists a case where the inequality becomes
strict. Thus, the distance-based mechanism dominates ND-
VCG but not vice versa. Since the revenue of FCFS-F is
always zero, while the revenue of the distance-based mech-
anism is non-negative for any input and can be strictly posi-
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Figure 3: Violation of Revenue Monotonicity.
tive, the distance-based mechanism also dominates FCFS-F
but not vice versa.
5.2 Revenue Monotonicity
The seller’s revenue is required to have some specific
form of monotonicity. Several forms of such revenue
monotonicity have been studied, including bidder revenue
monotonicity (Rastegari, Condon, and Leyton-Brown 2011;
Todo, Iwasaki, and Yokoo 2010) and item
revenue monotonicity, a.k.a. destruction-
proofness (Muto and Shirata 2017).
The condition studied in this section is weaker than bid-
der revenue monotonicity. A mechanism is follower revenue
monotonic if the seller’s revenue is monotonically increasing
with respect to the number of direct buyers. Let ti(θ
′ | r′s)
be the payment from buyer i when θ′ is reported and s sends
the information of the auction to a subset r′s of direct buyers.
Definition 8. A mechanism (f, t) is follower revenue mono-
tonic if for any rs, θ
′, and r′s ⊆ rs, it holds that∑
i∈N ti(θ
′ | rs) ≥
∑
i∈N ti(θ
′ | r′s).
For a multi-unit auction without any network among buy-
ers, there are several bidder revenuemonotonicmechanisms,
and thus follower revenuemonotonic ones. However, the ex-
ample below shows that, for auction via social network, our
mechanism is not even follower revenue monotonic.
Example 3. Consider two units and four buyers i1, i2, i3,
and i4; see Fig. 3. The priority order is i1 ≻ i2 ≻ i3 ≻ i4.
Assume all of the buyers behave sincerely. When the seller
s sends the information to all of its followers, i.e., i1, i2, and
i3, all buyers become connected. The price for each buyer
is given as p1 = 6, p2 = 6, p3 = 15, and p4 = 6, where
i2 and i4 win a unit and the revenue is 12. When s sends
the information only to i1 and i2, i3 becomes unconnected.
The price for each buyer is given as p1 = 0, p2 = 15, and
p4 =∞, where i1 and i2 win a unit and the revenue is 15. As
a result, the revenue is not maximized when the seller sends
the information to all the direct buyers.
Therefore, a question rises to the seller: to which set of
direct buyers should she send the information to maximize
her revenue?We define a simplified form of this problem, so
called OPTIMAL DIFFUSION, from the perspective of com-
putational complexity: Assuming that the seller knows the
exact network among buyers and that all buyers behave sin-
cerely, she tries to find an optimal set of direct buyers to
whom she should send the information.
Definition 9 (OPTIMAL DIFFUSION). Given a number k of
units, a profile θ′, a set rs of direct buyers, and a threshold
K , is there a subset r′s ⊆ rs s.t.
∑
i∈N ti(θ
′ | r′s) ≥ K
holds under the distance-based mechanism?
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Figure 4: Reduction from Partition: Network of Buyers.
We show that OPTIMAL DIFFUSION is NP-complete by
a reduction from PARTITION. Due to space limitations, we
present a proof sketch below; a full proof is in the appendix.
Definition 10 (PARTITION). Given a set A where each i ∈
A has a value v(i) ∈ Z+, does there exist a subsetA′ ⊆ A
such that
∑
i∈A′ v(i) = m, wherem =
∑
i∈A v(i)/2?
Theorem 5. OPTIMAL DIFFUSION is NP-complete.
Proof Sketch. First, OPTIMAL DIFFUSION is in NP since we
can compute
∑
i∈N ti(θ
′ |r′s) in polynomial time. Given an
instance of PARTITION, we construct an instance of OPTI-
MAL DIFFUSION as follows, with N = NA ∪NB ∪NC :
• For all i∈A, we create set (aij)0≤j≤v(i) in N
A such that
θai
0
=(ǫ, (aij)1≤j≤v(i)), and θaij =(v1, ∅) for 1≤j≤v(i).
• Set NB = (bj)1≤j≤m+2 is such that θb1 = (v2, {b2}),
θbj = (v3, {bj+1}) for 2≤j≤m+1, and θbm+2 = (v4, ∅).
• Set NC = (cj)1≤j≤m+1 is such that θcj = (ǫ, {cj+1})
for 1≤j≤m, and θcm+1 = (v5, ∅).
• The seller’s direct followers are (ai0)i∈A ∪ {b1, c1}.
The network is illustrated in Fig. 4. Buyers are labelled with
any ascending order of d(·) satisfying bm+1 ≻ cm+1. The
prices satisfy ǫ < v2 < v1 < v3 << v4 < v5. The number of
units is k=m+ 2 and the threshold isK=ǫ+m · v1 + v4.
We briefly argue the validity of the reduction. Notice that
buyers b1 and c1 belong to any r
′
s⊆rs such that
∑
i∈N ti(θ |
r′s) ≥ K , since otherwise price v4 cannot be reached.
If |{a ∈ r′s | va = v1}| = m holds, i.e., exactly m de-
scendants with value v1 can be chosen (thus the original
PARTITION is “yes”), then buyer b1 buys at price ǫ, buyers
(bi)2≤i≤m+1 at price v1, and buyer cm+1 at price v4. Hence,∑
i∈N ti(θ | r
′
s) = ǫ+m ·v1+v4 = K and OPTIMAL DIF-
FUSION is “yes”.
If the original PARTITION is “no”, either (i)
|a ∈ r′s | va = v1| < m or (ii) |a ∈ r
′
s | va = v1| > m
holds. In the case (i), buyers b1 and b2 buy at price ǫ. Hence,∑
i∈N ti(θ | r
′
s) < K and OPTIMAL DIFFUSION is “no”.
In the case (ii), buyer b1 does not buy, and cm+1 buys
at price lower than v4. Hence,
∑
i∈N ti(θ | r
′
s) < K and
OPTIMAL DIFFUSION is “no”.
6 Incentive Analysis
Now we show that, compared with those two naı¨ve mech-
anisms, our mechanism also has its own strength on buy-
ers incentive; in those mechanisms, hiding the information,
combined with the report of the true value, is also a domi-
nant strategy, while this is not the case in our mechanism for
any k ≥ 2. This indicates that the incentive for each buyer to
report her type truthfully in the distance-based mechanism is
stronger than that in both of those naı¨ve ones.
Proposition 4. Assume k ≥ 2. For each i, reporting (vi, ∅)
is not a dominant strategy in the distance-based mechanism.
Proof. Consider k units and k+2 buyers i1, . . . , ik+2, such
that rs = {i1, i3, i5, i6, . . . , ik+2}, θi1 = (15, {i2}), θi2 =
(20, ∅), θi3 = (10, {i4}), θi4 = (9, ∅), and θij = (30, ∅)
for all 5 ≤ j ≤ k + 2. The priority is given as i5 ≻ i6 ≻
· · · ≻ ik+2 ≻ i3 ≻ i1 ≻ i4 ≻ i2. The first k − 2 units are
sold to {ij}5≤j≤k+2, regardless of i1’s forwarding strategy.
Under i1’s sincere forwarding to i2, i1 wins a unit and pays
9. If i1 does not forward the information to i2, then i1 would
win a unit and pay 10. So not forwarding the information is
dominated by a sincere forwarding in this case.
Proposition 5. For each i, reporting (vi, ∅) is a dominant
strategy in both ND-VCG and FCFS-F.
Proof. In ND-VCG, only the reports from the direct buyers
affect the outcome. Therefore, for each direct buyer i ∈ rs,
any valuation report v′i, and any action by other buyers, the
choice of r′i ⊆ ri does not change the outcome at all.
In FCFS-F, for each i ∈ N , any follower of i who origi-
nally arrives after i under i’s sincere forwarding ri is still ar-
riving after i under any manipulation r′i ⊂ ri. Thus, whether
i wins a unit does not depend on the choice of r′i.
7 Conclusions
The distance-based mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness,
non-wastefulness, non-deficit, and individual rationality.
The performance is comprehensively analyzed; it dominates
the two naı¨ve mechanisms in terms of both social surplus
and revenue. Several other properties are also revealed.
A more detailed analysis on the complexity of maxi-
mizing the seller’s revenue is required, such as for the
case with a fixed number k of units. Our future work will
also include more general revenue analysis, e.g., revenue
equivalence (Heydenreich et al. 2009) and revenue optimal-
ity (Myerson 1981). Extending the distance-based mecha-
nism for more general domains, such as multi-unit auctions
with decreasing marginal values, is also crucial. Considering
an obviously strategy-proof auction via social network will
also be an interesting direction (Li 2017).
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A Discussion on Revelation Principle
The revelation principle is a fundamental concept of mech-
anism design, which specifies the relation between di-
rect revelation and indirect mechanisms. If an indirect
mechanism has a dominant strategy equilibrium, then we
can find a strategy-proof direct revelation mechanism that
results in the same outcome in the equilibrium. How-
ever, in a non-standard setting, e.g., online mechanism de-
sign (Parkes 2007), the revelation principle might fail. Thus,
we need to exert caution.
First, a direct revelation mechanism should not utilize any
information that is unavailable in an indirect mechanism. On
one hand, in our setting, the seller does not know the exis-
tence of the buyers who are not directly connected to her.
On the other hand, in a direct revelation mechanism, we as-
sume the mechanism designer knowsN , i.e., all the buyers,
and gets reports from each buyer in N . We require that in a
feasible allocation, a direct revelation mechanism can only
allocate a unit to a connected buyer. Thus, a feasible direct
revelation mechanism does not utilizes any information that
is unavailable in an indirect mechanism.
Second, the space of possible manipulations in a direct
revelation mechanism must be equivalent to that in an in-
direct mechanism. In our setting, a buyer can strategically
stop forwarding the information to her followers. By assum-
ing that buyer i, whose true followers are ri, can report only
r′i ⊆ ri, we preserve the equivalence. However, just preserv-
ing the equivalence is inadequate. An intuitive explanation
why the revelation principle holds is as follows. Assume an
indirect mechanism with a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Then we can create a direct revelation mechanism, by in-
troducing a mediator between the indirect mechanism and a
participant. The mediator asks for the participant’s true type
and plays her dominant strategy. So she does not have an
incentive for lying to the mediator. When the possible ma-
nipulations/reportable types are restricted, this is no longer
true. Intuitively, assume a participant misreports her type to
the mediator. Then the mediator does the best manipulation
based on the reported type. As a result, the space of possi-
ble manipulations in the direct revelation mechanism can be
expanded more compared to that of the indirect mechanism.
Green and Laffont (1986) proposed a condition on re-
portable types called the nested range condition (NRC) and
showed that it is actually a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the revelation principle to hold for the case of mech-
anism design with transfer functions, such as auctions. Intu-
itively, NRC is a transitivity condition, which requires that
if an agent (buyer) with type θi can pretend to have type θ
′
i
and if an agent with type θ′i can pretend to have type θ
′′
i , then
the agent with type θi can also pretend to have type θ
′′
i . In
our model, NRC obviously holds, since the restriction on ri
satisfies transitivity, and there is no restriction on reportable
valuation functions. Therefore, to discuss the outcome in a
dominant strategy equilibrium in an auction via social net-
work, focusing on direct revelation mechanisms is without
loss of generality.
B The Formal Definitions of Two Naı¨ve
Mechanisms
Definition 11 (ND-VCG). Given θ′, No-Diffusion-VCG
(f, t) is defined as follows:
fi(θ
′) =
{
1 if i ∈ rs ∧ v′i ≥ v
∗(rs \ {i}, k)
0 otherwise.
ti(θ
′) =
{
v∗(rs \ {i}, k) if fi(θ
′) = 1
0 otherwise.
Definition 12 (FCFS-F). Given θ′, first label the connected
buyers Nˆ in an ascending order of d(·), as we did in the
proposed mechanism (described in Definition 6). Assume
w.l.o.g. that the order is 1, 2, . . . , |Nˆ |. Then, FCFS-for-Free
(f, t) is defined as follows:
fi(θ
′) =
{
1 if i ≤ k
0 otherwise.
ti(θ
′) = 0 for all i ∈ N
C Omitted Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Theorem 1. Let (f, t) be the proposed mechanism.
Feasibility: Since v∗(·, k′) = ∞ for any k′ ≤ 0, and k′
is initialized by k and decremented whenever a unit is sold
(see lines 4–6 of the procedure), at most k connected buyers
buy a unit, i.e.,
∑
i∈N fi(θ
′) ≤ k for any θ′. Furthermore,
since any unconnected buyer has no chance to buy a unit,
feasibility is guaranteed.
Individual Rationality: Each buyer i faces a price pi and
buys a unit only when v′i ≥ pi. Thus, under truth-telling,
each buyer’s price is not strictly larger than the true value vi
if she wins a unit, i.e., vi ≥ pi, which guarantees individual
rationality.
Non-Deficit: Furthermore, by the definition of v∗, the
price for each winner is non-negative. Since each loser re-
ceives no compensation, it also satisfies non-deficit.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let (f, t) be the distance-based mech-
anism. Consider an arbitrary report profile θ′. If |Nˆ | ≤ k,
the price that each buyer i ∈ Nˆ faces is v∗(Nˆ−i \ Wˆ≻i, k −
|Wˆ≻i|). Since |Nˆ−i \ Wˆ≻i| < |Nˆ | − |Wˆ≻i| ≤ k − |Wˆ≻i|,
the price is 0. Thus, the number of winners is |Nˆ | =
min(k, |Nˆ |), satisfying non-wastefulness. We then focus on
the case of k < |Nˆ |. Assume for the sake of contradiction
that the number of units sold under θ′ is strictly smaller than
k. More specifically, lettingm :=
∑
i∈Nˆ fi(θ
′), we assume
thatm < k holds.
Assume w.l.o.g. that the top m + 1 buyers among Nˆ , in
terms of reported values, are labeled as i1, i2, . . . , im+1 in a
descending order of reported value v′, with an arbitrary tie-
breaking, i.e., v′i1 ≥ v
′
i2
≥ . . . ≥ v′im+1 . Also let M be the
top m buyers, i.e., M := {i1, . . . , im}. First, we show by
induction that each member ofM must be a winner. For the
base case, let us show that i1 obtains a unit. The price of i1 is
given as v∗(N−i1 \Wˆ≻i1 , k−|Wˆ≻i1 |). Since k−|Wˆ≻i1 | ≥ 1
(note that we assume the number of winners is fewer than
k), this value is less than or equal to v∗(N−i1 , 1) ≤ v
′
i1
.
Thus, i1 is a winner. For the inductive case, let us assume
M ′ = {i1, . . . , ig} are winners. We show that ig+1 is also a
winner. Let M ′′ denote {i ∈ M ′ | d(i) < d(ig+1)}. Also,
let g1 denote |M ′′| and g2 denote g − g1. Since ig+1 is the
g + 1-st buyer and M ′ is the set of top g buyers, v′ig+1 =
v∗(Nˆ \W ′, 1 + g − w′) holds for any subset W ′ ⊆ M ′,
where w′ := |W ′|. Furthermore, since the function v∗ is
monotonically non-decreasing on the first argument, Nˆ ⊇
Nˆ−ig+1 implies v
∗(Nˆ \ W ′, 1 + g − w′) ≥ v∗(Nˆ−ig+1 \
W ′, 1 + g − w′). The price of ig+1 is given as v
∗(Nˆ−ig+1 \
Wˆ≻ig+1 , k − |Wˆ≻ig+1 |). Since k − |Wˆ≻ig+1 | ≥ g2 + 1 and
Wˆ≻ig+1 is a superset of M
′′, the price is smaller than or
equal to v∗(Nˆ−ig+1\M
′′, g2+1). Combiningwith the above
inequality (where we chooseW ′ toM ′′, s.t. |M ′′| = g1 and
g2 = g − g1), the price is smaller than or equal to v∗(Nˆ \
M ′′, 1+ g− |M ′′|), which equals v′ig+1 . Thus, ig+1 must be
a winner. Therefore, each member of M is allocated a unit.
Also, since we assume the number of winners ism, only the
members ofM obtain a unit.
Now consider the buyer im+1. Since M is the set of top
m buyers and im+1 is the m+ 1-st buyer, v
′
im+1
= v∗(Nˆ \
W ′, 1+m−w′) holds for any subsetW ′ ⊆M , wherew′ :=
|W ′|. Furthermore, since the function v∗ is monotonically
non-decreasing on the first argument, Nˆ ⊇ Nˆ−im+1 implies
v∗(Nˆ \W ′, 1+m−w′) ≥ v∗(Nˆ−im+1 \W
′, 1+m−w′).
The price that the buyer faces is given as v∗(Nˆ−im+1 \
Wˆ≻im+1 , k − |Wˆ≻im+1 |). Since m < k and both m and k
are integers,m+ 1 ≤ k holds. Thus, we have v∗(Nˆ−im+1 \
Wˆ≻im+1 , 1+m− |Wˆ≻im+1 |) ≥ v
∗(Nˆ−im+1 \ Wˆ≻im+1 , k−
|Wˆ≻im+1 |) from the definition of v
∗. Since Wˆ≻im+1 is also
a subset of M , from the above inequalities, we finally have
v′im+1 ≥ v
∗(Nˆ−im+1 \Wˆ≻im+1 , k−|Wˆ≻im+1 |), where RHS
is the price that im+1 faces. Therefore, she also wins a unit,
violating the assumption that onlym units are sold.
D Omitted Proof for Section 4
Proof of Lemma 3. If ℓ ≥ k, k units are allocated from
Theorem 2. Assume ℓ < k. Let M = {i1, . . . , iℓ} de-
note the set of buyers whose evaluation values are more
than or equal to vr. Without loss of generality, we assume
vi1 ≥ vi2 ≥ . . . ≥ viℓ holds, and show that each buyer
in M is allocated a unit by induction. For the base case,
we show that i1 obtains a unit. The price of i1 is given as
v∗(N−i1 \W≻i1 , k − |W≻i1 |). Since k − |W≻i1 | ≥ 1, this
value is less than or equal to v∗(N−i1 , 1) ≤ vi1 . Thus, i1 is
a winner.
For the inductive case, assume M ′ = {i1, . . . , ig} are
winners for any g < ℓ. We show that ig+1 is also a win-
ner. LetM ′′ denote {i ∈M ′ | d(i) < d(ig+1)}. Also, let g1
denote |M ′′| and g2 denote g− g1. Since ig+1 is the g+1-st
buyer andM ′ is the set of top g buyers, it holds that
v′ig+1 = v
∗(Nˆ \W ′, 1 + g − w′),
for any subset W ′ ⊆ M ′, where w′ := |W ′|. Furthermore,
since the function v∗ is monotonically non-decreasing on the
first argument, Nˆ ⊇ Nˆ−ig+1 implies
v∗(Nˆ \W ′, 1 + g − w′) ≥ v∗(Nˆ−ig+1 \W
′, 1 + g − w′).
The price of ig+1 is given as v
∗(Nˆ−ig+1 \ Wˆ≻ig+1 , k −
|Wˆ≻ig+1 |). Since k − |Wˆ≻ig+1 | ≥ g2 + 1 and Wˆ≻ig+1
is a superset of M ′′, the price is smaller than or equal to
v∗(Nˆ−ig+1 \ M
′′, g2 + 1). Combining with the above in-
equality (where we choose W ′ to M ′′, s.t. |M ′′| = g1 and
g2 = g − g1), we can see that the price is smaller than or
equal to v∗(Nˆ \ M ′′, 1 + g − |M ′′|), which equals v′ig+1 .
Thus, ig+1 must be a winner. Therefore, all the top ℓ buyers
are allocated a unit.
E Omitted Proof for Section 5
Proof of Theorem 5. First, OPTIMAL DIFFUSION is in NP
since it is polynomial to compute
∑
i∈N ti(θ
′ | r′s). We
show that this problem is NP-complete by a reduction from
PARTITION. Given an instance of PARTITION, we construct
an instance of OPTIMAL DIFFUSION as follows. First, let us
partition the set of buyers in three subsetsN = NA∪NB ∪
NC .
• For each i ∈ A, we create (v(i) + 1) buyers
(aij)j∈[0,...,v(i)] in N
A such that:
– θ′
ai
0
= (ǫ, (aij)j∈[1,...,v(i)]),
– θ′
aij
= (v1, ∅) for all j ∈ [1, . . . , v(i)].
• SetNB = (bj)j∈[1,...,m+2] is composed of (m+2) buyers
such that:
– θ′b1 = (v2, {b2}),
– θ′bj = (v3, {bj+1}) for all j ∈ [2, . . . ,m+ 1],
– θ′bm+2 = (v4, ∅).
• SetNC = (cj)j∈[1,...,m+1] is composed of (m+1) buyers
such that:
– θ′cj = (ǫ, {cj+1}) for all j ∈ [1, . . . ,m],
– θ′cm+1 = (v5, ∅).
The network construction is illustrated in Figure 5.
The prices satisfy the following condition:
ǫ < v2 < v1 < v3 << v4 < v5
Buyers are labelled with any ascending order of d(·) satis-
fying that buyer bm+1 has priority over buyer cm+1. Finally,
the number of unit is k = m + 2 and the threshold value is
K = ǫ+m · v1 + v4.
Now, we show that there exists a set A′ ⊆ A such that∑
i∈A′ v(i) if and only if there exists a set r
′
s ⊆ rs such that∑
i∈N ti(θ
′ | r′s) ≥ ǫ+m · v1 + v4.
(⇒) Assume that there exists a subset A′ ⊆
A such that
∑
i∈A′ v(i) = m. Consider the set
r′s = {a
i
0 ∈ rs : i ∈ A
′} ∪ {b1} ∪ {c1}. Notice that when
the seller shares the information with r′s, the number of buy-
ers with value v1 involved in the auction is exactlym. Then
the mechanism runs as follows:
sǫ
a10
ǫ
az0
v2
b1
ǫ
c1
v1
a11
v1
a1
v(a1)
v1
az1
v1
az
v(az)
v3
b2
ǫ
c2
v3
bm+1
. . .
. . . ǫ
cm
v4
bm+2
v5
cm+1
...
...
...
v(a1) buyers with value v1
N
A
v(az) buyers with value v1
N
B
N
C
Figure 5: Reduction from PARTITION: Network and Values of Buyers.
• Buyers (ai0)i∈A receive price v3, and thus they do not buy.
• For buyer b1, there are (m + 1) values that are greater
than v2 (one value v5 from buyer cm+1 and m values v1
from buyers (aij)ai0∈r′s,j∈[1,...,v(i)]). Hence, buyer b1 re-
ceives price ǫ and buys one unit.
• Buyer c1 receives price v1 and does not buy.
• Buyers (aij)ai0∈r′s,j∈[1,...,v(i)] receive price v3 and do not
buy.
• For j ∈ [2, . . . ,m]:
– Buyer bj receives price v1 and buys one unit.
– Buyer cj receives price v3 and does not buy.
• For j = m + 1, there are two units remaining, and thus
buyer bm+1 receives price v1 and buys an unit. Then,
buyer cm+1 receives price v4 and buys an unit. Finally,
there is no unit left for buyer bm+2.
Therefore, the revenue is ǫ+m · v1 + v4.
(⇐) Assume that there exists r′s ⊆ rs such that∑
i∈N ti(θ
′ | r′s) ≥ ǫ+m · v1 + v4. Since v3 << v4
holds, the threshold value can only be attained when buyer
cm+1 buys an unit at price v4. Since there exists only one
buyer with value v4 (buyer bm+2), it implies that b1 and
c1 belong to r
′
s, and that there is only one unit left when
the mechanism reaches buyer cm+1. Let us denote #v1 the
number of buyers with value v1 that are followers of buy-
ers in r′s. Note that, independently from the value taken by
#v1, the buyers (a
i
0)i∈A always receive price v3 and thus
they never buy. There are three cases to consider.
First, assume that #v1 > m, then the mechanism runs as
follows:
• For buyer b1, there are at leastm+2 values that are greater
than v2 (one value v5 from buyer cm+1 and at leastm+1
values v1). Hence, buyer b1 receives price v1 and does not
buy.
• Buyer c1 also receives price v1 and does not buy.
• Buyers (aij)ai0∈r′s,j∈[1,...,v(i)] receive price v3 and do not
buy.
• For j ∈ [2, . . . ,m]:
– Buyer bj receives price v1 and buys one unit.
– Buyer cj receives price v1 and does not buy.
• For j = m + 1, there are three units remaining, and thus
buyer bm+1 receives price v1 and buys. Then, buyer cm+1
also receives price v1 and buys. Finally, there is one unit
left for buyer bm+2 with price v1 and he buys.
Hence the revenue is (m+ 2) · v1, which is a contradiction.
Now, assume that #v1 < m, then the mechanism runs as
follows:
• For buyer b1, there are at most m values that are greater
than v2 (one value v5 from buyer cm+1 and at mostm−1
values v1). Hence, buyer b1 receives price ǫ and buys an
unit.
• Buyer c1 receives price v3 and does not buy.
• Buyers (aij)ai0∈r′s,j∈[1,...,v(i)] receive price v3 and do not
buy.
• For j ∈ [2, . . . ,m]:
– Buyer bj receives price{
ǫ, if j ≤ m−#v + 1,
v1, if j > m−#v + 1.
and buys one unit.
– Buyer cj receives price v3 and does not buy.
• For j = m+1, there are two units remaining. Buyer bm+1
and then buyer cm+1 receives price{
ǫ, if#v = 0,
v1, if#v ≥ 1.
and buys one unit each. Finally, there is no unit left for
buyer bm+2.
Hence the revenue is{
ǫ+ (m−#v1) · ǫ+ (#v1 + 1) · v1 if#v 6= 0,
(m+ 2) · ǫ if#v = 0.
Thus, it is strictly lower thanK , which is a contradiction.
Finally, assume that #v1 = m, then the mechanism runs
as it is described in the argument for (⇒), and the revenue
is thus ǫ+m · v1 + v4.
Therefore, in r′s and their followers, there exists exactlym
buyers with value v1. Hence the setA
′ = {i ∈ A : ai0 ∈ r
′
s}
is such that
∑
i∈A′ v(i) = m.
